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INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, regional issues have gradually moved into the centre-stage of the debate
on economic integration and international trade in Europe. The fading influence of the
nation-state goes together with a transfer of sovereignty to the European level combined
with a renewed interest in the region as a relevant economic unit.
Regional authorities are welcoming this evolution as a new opportunity for greater regional
autonomy. They are developing political and economic ties with other regions but are at the
same time promoting the strategic interests of their own region. This twofold strategy draws
a hesitant response from European Union (EU) regulators. They applaud the fact that
economic integration strengthens regional complementarities and co-operation. But the
increased regional competition raises the prospect of a greater use of policies that distort
competition in an integrated economic area. Moreover, EU regional policies that seek
convergence between high and low income regions would suffer from a systematic policy of
the stronger regions to expand their influence at the expense of the weaker regions.
From a theoretical point of view, those issues raise several questions that are addressed in
this paper. What are the driving forces for regional complementarities and regional
competition? How does economic integration affect regional competition ? What can
“strategic” regional policy do to promote narrowly defined regional interests ? And how do
EU-wide policies prevent distortions in regional competition?
This paper addresses those theoretical questions based on the literature in international
trade, regional agglomeration and multinational companies. Section 1 starts with a look at
theories that predict regional convergence as the outcome of the regional integration
process. Section 2 assesses recent theoretical contributions that focus on regional
agglomeration and explore the regional consequences of multinational companies. In a third
section, the scope for EU policies that prevent destructive regional competition is discussed.2
I. THE CONVERGENCE APPROACH
The question whether countries or regions converge as a result of trade integration has been
addressed in decades of economic research. International trade economists traditionally
adopt the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) framework as the basis for  their analysis.
This model assumes perfect competition in product and factor markets, full employment of
all factors, perfect intersectoral factor mobility within countries, identical tastes and access
to the same technologies for all countries. This theory leads to a strong convergence result
which is most easily understood by the concept of the integrated world equilibrium (see
Helpman and Krugman, 1995). In an integrated area, factor and product prices are
equalised implying full convergence of income per head.
The driving force of this convergence result depends on the type of model considered. If
factors of production are mobile across countries and regions, factor mobility guarantees
convergence. Intuitively, this can be grasped by a simple example. If German reunification
eliminates all barriers between the western and eastern part of Germany, East German
workers will massively move to the west in search for higher wages. West German
companies will invest in the East and introduce Western technologies. This process
continues until wages and the return to capital are fully equalised in the whole of Germany.
If factors of production do not move across countries (regions), convergence obtains as a
result of international (interregional) trade. Countries or regions specialise in products
which use intensively the factors of production that are abundant and cheap in that country
or region. This explains, for example, the strong trade expansion between selected EU
member states with Central and Eastern Europe. As a consequence of those trade relations,
the theory predicts that abundant production factors in each country will become more
expensive, that countries will adopt the same technology and that income levels will fully
converge.
It is clear that reality is more complicated than the theory or the strong convergence result
would lead us to believe. Strict empirical tests of the HOS theory are no great success.
Trefler (1995) considers a wide sample of 33 countries and 9 production factors using the
American input-output technology for every country. He finds that the theory does not
perform much better than a toss of the coin. The main culprit for this disappointing result is
the assumption that countries use the same technologies. If technological and demand
differences are taken into account, the theory does much better. This indicates that3
intersectoral specialisation and convergence factors may interact with technology to
determine the world-wide distribution of income levels.
A paper by Davis et al (1997) compares the performance of the HOS theory for a sample of
countries and a sample of Japanese regions. They find stronger convergence in income and
technology between Japanese regions than between countries. This should not be too
surprising because Japanese regions are geographically closer and belong to one country
without barriers to trade and factor mobility.
Translating this to the European case, one would expect that convergence is far more likely
between regions that have been integrating for a longer period of time. There is indeed
evidence that points in this direction. Over time regional inequality is declining in the
European Union although this is a slow and discontinuous process (see Abraham and Van
Rompuy, 1995). According to Fatas (1997) shocks that are affecting EU regions are
becoming more similar over time. Quah (1996) emphasises the importance of regional spill-
overs between neighbouring EU regions which matter more than macro-economic factors at
the national level. He also shows that the convergence in per capita income between
neighbouring regions occurs at a faster pace than the average convergence process for all
EU regions.
What does all of this imply for regional competition and strategic regional policy ? The main
message is that economic integration strengthens the interdependence between regions. This
implies that strategic policy by one region will have a strong impact on the surrounding
regions. In the extreme case of an integrated equilibrium with perfect factor mobility,
economic forces are likely to fully offset the policy. If, for instance, regional policy leads to
an increase in per capita income and wage levels, the region will experience an immediate
inflow of labour that brings down income and wages to the level of the other regions. In the
case of barriers to international factor mobility, a similar outcome is achieved but the
process takes much longer through an adjustment in trade and regional specialisation
patterns. Even then, the policy may invite countervailing actions by the other regions
because they are thoroughly affected by the strong interregional spill-overs. In short,
strategic regional policy is ineffective and causes frictions in a world that resembles the
HOS framework.
There is a nice corollary to this result. The theory predicts that economic integration
promotes regional convergence. Hence, integration achieves the catching-up process that
lagging regions often aim at when pursuing a strategic regional policy. Those regions may4
be better off with a policy that promotes regional adjustment and regional integration than
seeking higher growth at the expense of other regions.
2.  CONVERGENCE VS DIVERGENCE IN A WORLD WITH REGIONAL
AGGLOMERATION AND MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES
2.1. Regional agglomeration   
A very different picture of regional adjustment is offered by theories of regional
agglomeration. Taking up an old tradition in regional economics, Krugman (1991) elegantly
formalises some key driving forces of regional agglomeration. Krugman’s theoretical
assumptions deviate in several essential ways from the HOS trade model. He introduces
imperfect competition in product markets by assuming an imperfectly competitive sector
with product differentiation, monopolistic competition and Dixit-Stiglitz preferences.
Manufacturing wages across regions are not necessarily equalised as a result of regional
integration. Companies and manufacturing labour are mobile between regions but the
perfectly competitive agricultural sector is characterised by immobile farms and farmers.
Free entry of manufacturing companies guarantees zero profits in the long run.
In Krugman’s model, equilibria with regional convergence and regional divergence are both
possible. Regional wage differentials foster regional convergence of income levels. Lower
wages offer an incentive for companies in high wage regions to relocate. In this way, the
regional wage gap is gradually closed. This convergence process is however counteracted
by mechanisms that lead to regional divergence in income levels. Proximity to a large
market with high income levels attracts companies to locate in richer regions. In those
markets, firms are able to exploit economies of scale which lower their average costs and
strengthen their competitive position. In Krugman’s model, economies of scale are directly
linked to market power. Stronger economies of scale lead to more market power and less
competition. Ceteris paribus, firms prefer to be present in markets with a lower degree of
competition and fewer competitors.
Regional divergence follows from a cumulative process of self-reinforcing agglomeration.
Figure 1 presents this process in a simplified way. Assume that, for some exogenous reason,
demand in a region increases. Local companies benefit from this expansion of demand by
exploiting economies of scale which increases profitability. The enhanced profitability5
attracts new firms to the region. The increased competition and the lower average costs
translate in lower product prices : Krugman labels this as the competition effect. In turn,
lower prices raise the aggregate spending power of consumers through the effect on the
aggregate price index. New manufacturing jobs are created and labour moves in from other
regions attracted by high incomes and favourable employment perspectives. Increased
purchasing power and more consumers raise demand and set in motion a new round of
regional expansion.
consumer demand consumer demand
Figure 1. Cumulative agglomeration in the Krugman model
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The stylised Krugman model has been extended in later work to incorporate intermediate
inputs. Innovation and capital investment provide other sources of regional agglomeration.
Figure 2 shows how those driving forces interact with the determinants of the Krugman
model. This diagram makes an explicit distinction between final goods producers and
intermediate input suppliers.
The right hand side of the diagram reproduces the Krugman set-up with the difference that
competition between final good producers may induce cost-reducing innovation and may
lead to additional price cuts in the long run. The left hand side of the diagram focuses on the
interdependence between final and intermediate input producers. Higher demand for final
goods spills over in additional intermediate demand and engenders a home market effect for
companies supplying intermediate products. Economies of scale, innovation and
competition bring down the price of those inputs which in turn allow final good producers
to charge lower prices. A self-reinforcing process of rising regional income levels,6
innovation and clustering of companies and their suppliers takes place. The prospering
region leaps ahead in front of the other regions.


























(a) home market effect    (c) price index effect
(b) competition effect (d) innovation
Evidently, this process cannot go on forever. Krugman links the scope for regional
divergence to - among other factors - trade barriers and transport costs. Interestingly, in a
fully integrated area without such impediments the model reproduces the income
convergence result that characterises the HOS approach. In such setting any divergence in
regional wage levels encourages companies to exploit lower wage costs in the lagging
region and to ship the products at no cost to the larger market in the high income region.
On the contrary, partial economic integration may actually strengthen regional divergence
instead of promoting convergence as it does in the HOS framework. The reason is that
trade and other impediments shield companies in smaller regions from exports of firms from
other regions. When this protection is removed, stronger competition gives those companies
an incentive to locate closer to the larger market and serve the lower income region by
exporting rather than by local production. If so, the income gap between the richer and the
lagging region widens as a consequence of economic integration.7
2.2. Regional integration and multinational strategies
In the Krugman approach firms can move but they locate in one region only. In reality, the
growth of multinational companies with operations in many countries has been spectacular
in the last decades and exceeds the expansion of international trade volumes. A long-
standing research tradition attributes the motivation for multinational activities to company-,
plant- and location-specific advantages (see for instance Dunning,1980). More recently,
work by Brainard (1997) and Markusen et al. (1996),among others, links those ideas to the
newer theoretical developments in international trade and regional agglomeration. Which
insights do we obtain about regional convergence versus regional divergence ?
To address this question, it is useful to compare the theoretical set-up with the standard
Krugman approach. In fact, the building blocks are very similar with the exception that the
models with multinational companies make a distinction between company-specific
economies of scale such as headquarter services, corporate management or innovation
breakthroughs and plant-specific scale economies arising primarily from cost reductions due
to longer production runs. When the latter type of scale economies dominates, companies
have a tendency to concentrate production in one or a few plants and adopt an export
strategy. When economies of scale are primarily achieved at the corporate level, it pays off
to produce in several countries or regions. In this case, we observe plants producing similar
products in many locations (regions or countries) which we denote as horizontal strategies.
Alternatively, companies may want to exploit international or interregional cost differences
by establishing manufacturing plants with lower value added in low wage regions and by
concentrating headquarters and R&D in areas with a highly educated labour force. We
define this approach as a vertical strategy. Empirical evidence indicates that both vertical
and horizontal strategies are observed but that horizontal strategies are more common (e.g.
Abraham and Konings, 1997).
The distinction between horizontal and vertical strategies is important for the debate on
regional complementarities and regional competition. Horizontal strategies are motivated by
the desire to be present in large and growing markets. Production is primarily targeted at
the regional market where the plant is located and not at exports to the home market of the
multinational company. As a consequence, competition between different plants of the same
company is not so common while complementarities at the corporate level often exist
through the provision of specialised inputs, R&D, headquarter and management services.
By contrast, vertical strategies usually put regions or countries in direct competition when
multinational firms select the location with the best combination of cost conditions and8
productivity levels. In this situation regional and national authorities have a powerful
incentive to attract companies by providing favourable investment conditions.
What is the relation between economic integration and regional convergence in models of
multinational operations ? Vertical strategies exploit cross-border factor price differentials
and, in this way, promote the convergence between higher and lower cost regions.
However, some production activities are likely to be closed down in the higher cost region.
This delocalisation creates political and social resistance against the convergence process.
Another finding of the theoretical literature is that convergence in regional income levels
makes horizontal strategies more likely. This would imply that regional complementarities
dominate in regions with similar income levels while regional competition is the most
pronounced when integration is considered between regions at different stages of economic
development.
2.3.  Strategic regional policy
As became clear in the preceding paragraphs, the introduction of agglomeration effects and
multinational strategies in trade models offers insights that are not captured by the HOS
approach. In effect, we obtain a broader picture of the determinants of regional
competitiveness. Relative factor endowments - which are the basis for regional
specialisation in HOS models with imperfect factor mobility - remain an important factor.
But a regional competitive advantage can also be built on (i) the presence of a large and
growing market (ii) innovation and efficient technologies (iii) economies of scale and
learning effects and (iv) vertical links between companies.
This broader view widens the scope for strategic regional policies. Policies that strengthen
the productive base of a region and that raise the productivity of the regional labour force
and the regional capital stock contribute to regional competitiveness. Innovation policy and
subsidies to R&D may promote regional innovation. Regions can attract business by
providing tax breaks and subsidies to selected companies in strategic sectors. Or they may
attempt to control the evolution of wages and non-wage labour costs to make their region
an attractive low cost area to invest.
Those strategic policies are not without risk for reasons mentioned earlier. It remains true
that interregional dependence creates direct spill-overs from one region’s strategic policy to
competing regions. This invites countervailing actions by other regions and may trigger a9
full-fledged regional subsidy war which harms all regions. The literature on strategic trade
policy (see Eaton and Grossman, 1986) emphasises that such outcome is the logical
consequence of the greater scope for strategic policies. In fact, regions are confronted with
a standard prisoner dilemma : while they would benefit from an overall ban on strategic
policies, the incentive for each individual region to engage in such policies is too strong. To
avoid this negative scenario, a binding commitment is needed that refrains regions from
doing so.  In the European context, the responsibility for preventing a race-to-the-bottom -
that is a mutually detrimental competition among regions and countries - is placed in the
hands of EU institutions.
3.  EU POLICY TOWARDS REGIONAL COMPETITION
A broad range of EU policies explicitly or implicitly aim to avoid a race-to-the-bottom. As
seen in Table 1, regional policy, fiscal harmonisation and social policy can be viewed from
this perspective. For each of those policy fields, the table distinguishes between three
regulatory strategies. Policy can be aimed at establishing EU minimum standards which
keep countries or regions from triggering a downward spiral. Alternatively, EU policy
initiatives can promote regional adjustment, co-ordination and agreements between regions,
countries and interest groups. This strengthens mutually beneficial complementarities.
Finally, sanctions can be used in the framework of EU competition policy.
EU regional policy counteracts a race-to-the-bottom in an indirect way.  The objective is to
promote regional cohesion within the EU by closing the gap between the higher and lower
income regions. In doing so, lagging regions have fewer incentives to conduct policies that
attract business at the expense of other regions. Moreover, the centralisation of regional
subsidisation at the European level should allow for a more objective assessment of the
regions that are in need of structural assistance. EU regional policy takes a regulatory
approach of establishing minimum targets for relative income per capita of European
regions. Most of the regional funds go to Objective 1 regions which have a GDP per capita
that does not exceed 75% of the EU average.10




































































Regional funds promote regional adjustment by improving the structural conditions in
lagging regions. A sustained willingness to pay by the prosperous regions requires that the
money is spent wisely. The principle of additionality, according to which the receiving
countries are obliged to finance part of the regional projects, is supposed to contribute to a
selection of viable projects. At the end of the project an evaluation of the effectiveness of
the regional programs is carried out by the EU Commission. As a sanction, future regional
funding can be cut if program objectives are not met. In spite of those efforts, the efficiency
of regional support remains a controversial issue.
With the creation of a monetary union, fiscal harmonisation is quickly becoming one of the
top priorities on the EU policy agenda. In an integrated economic zone with a single
currency, differences in VAT, corporate taxation and financial taxes exert a profound
impact on capital flows and on the location of companies. The concern prevails that
countries will compete in attracting companies and financial investment by offering a
favorable tax treatment. This would easily trigger a sharp EU-wide reduction in taxation of
mobile production factors. Confronted with declining tax revenues, governments may have
to cut expenditures on essential public functions or to raise taxes on the less mobile
production factors. Already, there is evidence of a gradual shift in taxation from capital to
labour in most EU countries since the early 1980’s. Higher labour taxes, in turn, contribute
to rising labour costs which push up unemployment.11
To a large extent, the EU approach towards taxation is based on the concept of minimum
tax rates and increased transparancy in areas that are most sensitive to competitive
distortions. Those efforts led to the adoption of EU-wide minimum VAT and excise tax
rates in the early 1990’s. So far, no consensus has been reached on minimum financial and
profit taxes although European monetary union is reviving the interest for a comprehensive
tax agreement. Nevertheless, fiscal harmonisation requires unanimity in the EU Council of
Ministers. In view of the opposition against EU tax initiatives by member countries such as
Luxembourg and the UK, unanimity is not easily achieved.
In December 1997, agreement was reached by EU member states on the so-called Code of
Conduct. This code deals with corporate taxation and provides an interesting example of
how member countries can mutually co-ordinate their tax policies on a European scale. EU
member countries pledged to abolish special tax schemes that grant substantial tax
advantages to selected companies. In this way, the agreement deviates from the usual EU
ambition to determine legally binding minimum tax rates through direct EU legislation.
EU competition policy dealing with national subsidies (Article 92-93 of the Treaty of
Rome) gives the European Commission the authority to act against subsidies that distort
competition on EU markets. When regions grant and companies or industries obtain
subsidies or tax advantages, the Commission can order national and regional authorities to
abolish the subsidy or tax scheme. The companies can be obliged to repay the subsidy. This
sanction-based approach allows for a case-by-case treatment of distortive measures but
does not involve the creation of a broader legislative framework that sets the ground rules
for fiscal competition in the EU.
The goals of EU social policy are to stimulate employment and to guarantee a sufficient
degree of social protection. The relevance for this paper stems from the argument that EU
social policy may help to prevent a downward spiral in social protection. While there is little
evidence that full-fledged social dumping is actually taking place, intensive competitive
pressure in an integrated European market gives countries or regions an incentive to lower
social protection in an effort to reduce labour costs.
EU social policy involves the three regulatory strategies that were discussed above.
According to the Social Protocol to the Maastricht Treaty, the EU is assigned the
competence to establish legally binding minimum requirements in selected social domains
with a qualified majority in the Council of Ministers. This had led to a few directives dealing12
with maternity leave, working time and the information of workers in larger companies. So
far, the scope of this social legislation is rather limited not in the least because social
security is largely left untouched.
Furthermore, the Social Protocol to the Maastricht Treaty encourages social agreements
between employers and unions on a European scale. If such an agreement is reached on a
specific issue, EU institutions will refrain from own legislative initiatives in this domain. Up
to now, EU-wide social agreements cover parental leave for smaller children and the rights
of part-time workers and of other employees with an a-typical working time. The failure to
reach a consensus between unions and employers on work councils and worker information
in smaller companies is prompting the European Commission to advance its own legislative
proposals.
EU institutions also play a role in co-ordinating joint social initiatives of member countries.
A recent example is the target approach for unemployment that was launched at the end of
1997. In the European Council, member countries agreed on quantitative targets for the
training and the reintegration of unemployed workers in the labour force. Countries were
free to make their own proposals on how to achieve those targets. Subsequently, the
proposed plans were evaluated by the EU Commission. Presumably this target approach
could also be used to avoid a race-to-the-bottom in social protection. This strategy can be
backed up by EU competition policy on national subsidisation. In fact, the European
Commission is opposed to selective reductions in social security contributions granted to
specific companies, sectors or regions.
CONCLUSION
This paper takes a broad view on regional competition in the EU. Against the background
of the recent literature in international trade, regional agglomeration and multinational
strategies, we focus on the driving forces of regional competition. We point to the scope for
and the risks of strategic regional policies and assess what EU authorities are doing to
prevent a detrimental escalation of beggar-thy-neighbour policies.
An eclectic view on the theories surveyed in this paper leads us to conclude that there are
many determinants of regional competitiveness. Regions can try to develop regional
strengths by adopting appropriate policy initiatives. Those regional policies do not
necessarily come at the expense of other regions. Many complementarities exist among13
European regions and those can be strengthened by ambitious projects of market
integration, regional adjustment and convergence between higher and lower income regions.
By contrast, regional integration can also intensify strategic competition among regions.
This is particularly the case in a setting with competing regional clusters and multinational
companies that base their investments on a detailed comparison of regional productivity and
cost levels. In this environment regions have a strong incentive to lure business away from
competing regions by subsidies, tax breaks, reduced labour costs and lower levels of social
protection.
Strategic policies are not without risks in an integrated economic area. They are ineffective
when factor mobility and trade in goods and services quickly neutralise regional imbalances
in income and wage levels. They are counterproductive when they draw a countervailing
policy response from competing regions or countries. They are outright harmful when
countries or regions get involved in a subsidy war, a race-to-the-bottom in social standards
or a sharp reduction in tax revenues.
EU policies help to prevent this negative outcome. In this paper, we highlighted the role of
EU regional, tax and social policies in establishing minimum requirements and in promoting
co-ordination and consensus. We mentioned that EU competition policy on national
subsidies can be used to act against competitive distortions caused by policy measures of
national or regional governments.
Does the existing EU policy framework guard against mutually destructive competition
between regions and countries ? The answer to this question is not straightforward because
it is unclear whether the race-to-the-bottom scenario indeed poses a real threat at this stage.
Neither are we able to fully assess the incentives for regional competition in the changing
environment of a monetary union. What can be said however with reasonable confidence is
that the current EU regulatory framework is too fragmentary to prevent widespread beggar-
thy-neighbour policies if countries or regions would decide to take this route. But then
again, regions or countries may very well refrain from doing so when they become aware of
the risks of strategic policies. They may instead prefer a more comprehensive set of EU
rules that strengthen mutually beneficial co-operation.14
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